

**STRATEGY  
RESEARCH  
PROJECT**

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**COMBINED LOGISTICS OFFICERS ADVANCED COURSE  
(CLOAC): LEADER DEVELOPMENT FOR FUTURE ORDNANCE  
STRATEGIC LEADERS**

**BY**

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**COMBINED LOGISTICS OFFICERS ADVANCED COURSE (CLOAC): Leader  
Development for Future Ordnance Strategic Leaders**

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## **ABSTRACT**

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Formal training is one of the methods for development of strategic leaders. The development of strategic Ordnance leaders is rooted initially with an officer first becoming competent as a leader and knowledgeable in their technical skills. The Advanced Course phase of the current Professional Military Education implemented by the Army is for captains. These captains receive training necessary to be successful in company command. The Combined Logistics Officer Advanced Course (CLOAC) for logisticians adds an additional requirement to prepare them for assignments as multifunctional staff officers at the battalion/brigade level. Army budget reductions have also an effect upon the CLOAC program. The impact of these reductions is difficult to determine as concurrent to these reductions training methodologies have been implemented for more efficient, but not necessarily more effective training. The short implementation period inhibits a thorough analysis of the program for developing future Strategic logistics leaders.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	1
THESIS STATEMENT OR CONTENTION OF INQUIRY.....	2
THE PROBLEM.....	3
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.....	3
ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM.....	3
ASSUMPTIONS.....	4
SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE PROBLEM.....	5
HYPOTHESES.....	5
PROCEDURES/DEVELOPMENT OF INTERVIEWS.....	6
BACKGROUND.....	6
REVIEW OF MATERIAL.....	10
MACRO VIEW-NATIONAL LEVEL, JOINT AND ARMY LEVEL INFORMATION.....	11
JOINT VISION 2010.....	12
ARMY VISION 2010 AND US ARMY POSTURE STATEMENT FY 98.....	13
GENERAL CREIGHTON ABRAM'S COMMENTS RELATIVE TO OUR FUTURE.....	14
READINESS ACCORDING TO THE ARMY STAFF.....	15
EDUCATION AND LEARNING ENVIRONMENT.....	15

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT)

ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMATION.....	17
PROBLEM QUESTIONS.....	18
ANALYSIS OF COURSE MATERIAL AND POI.....	26
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	27
SUMMARY.....	29
ENDNOTES.....	32
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	35

*"Combat demands thinking, independent leaders and troops, capable of independent action."*<sup>1</sup>

A 1906 German Regulation as quoted in  
Command in War by Van Creveld

## DEVELOPMENT OF ORDNANCE STRATEGIC LEADERS: EXAMINING THE FORMAL TRAINING PROGRAM AT THE ADVANCED COURSE LEVEL

Regrettably, our world will continue to be engaged in some level of warfare throughout the foreseeable future. In fact, "Today, war remains not only possible, but as a simple statistical matter, highly likely. War, rather than being an exceptional condition, has been a regular and frequent part of the international system."<sup>2</sup> War has become a way of life in many parts of the world. War is often supported by increases in the quality of armed forces via education, e.g. leadership, Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures (TTPs) and the use of advanced technology.

Much of the great discussion throughout the U. S. Army revolves around the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Technology is an important ingredient for the cornerstone of this "revolution." Many books have been written on the use of automation in reengineering and the enormous potential of the increasingly more powerful computer chip.

Unfortunately, "Technology changes how men fight and die, but it does not change the horror and glory of battle, nor does it change the reality of death."<sup>3</sup> As always, "The

warrior's trade will remain one of courage, dedication and suffering."<sup>4</sup>

An educated military is important to our world class Army that bears the brunt of the "warrior's trade." Specifically, education of our Ordnance Corps officers is important for the future development of logistical strategic leaders. Our current Army doctrine defines leader development to occur in a triad: Institutional, Operational, and Self-development.<sup>5</sup> Senior leaders will depend upon them for advice and our Institutional training base for Captains can play a major role in the development of Strategic leaders.

#### THESIS STATEMENT or CONTENTION OF INQUIRY

The development of future Ordnance strategic leaders is at risk of degradation by reductions in course material (tasks) of our Ordnance officers' institutional training at the Combined Logistics Officer Advanced Course (CLOAC). Minimal formal institutional training limits the development of technical and tactical competence, which is the first tenet of the Army's leadership field manual: FM 22-100.<sup>6</sup> These unit level competencies support an officer's ability for development as a learning leader and one who can use critical/creative thinking and formal decisionmaking tools. The reduced formal task training results in a decreased

ability by Ordnance officers to generate well-reasoned strategic alternatives as those officers progress into the ranks of strategic logisticians.<sup>7</sup>

### THE PROBLEM

#### Statement of the Problem

The primary purpose of this study was to determine if the degradation of formal institutional training tasks impacts upon the development of future strategic Ordnance leaders. Secondary purposes were to identify the qualities of the instructional environment that impact upon development of the Army's diverse group of junior leaders.

#### Analysis of the Problem

The solution of this problem required answers to the following questions:

1. What "vision" is used to determine the training?
2. What are considered the core proficiencies for maintenance company command and a battalion/brigade level multifunctional logistician?
3. What are considered the priorities for instructions, e.g. company command or staff officer?
4. Is there a Quality Assurance/Quality Control program used to improve the Program of Instruction, instructor performance and student support?

5. What are the methods of instruction used by the school?

6. What characteristics are used to define the quality of CLOAC's instructors?

7. Is cross-talking or interstaffing conducted between the technical schools, ALMC and other Advanced Courses?

8. Is there any relationship to business' method of leader development as described in the follow-on questions proposed by educational literature?<sup>8</sup>

9. Do the training tasks address key challenges facing the organization?

A. Is the training linked to challenges of organization or tasks to be met?

B. Does the training communicate the organization's vision/unity of purpose?

C. Does the training build teamwork and assist with establishing networks?

#### Assumptions

The following assumptions were made for this study:

1. Course supervisors and instructors were competent in their ability to assess their program. This premise is subject to wide variations in bias and potential error in outcome.

2. The examination of the Program of Instruction would indicate the type of instruction received by the students and task knowledge requirements.

3. Characteristics of the supervisors and instructors would indicate the quality of the program.

#### Scope and Limitations of the Problem

The study was limited to a review of the Program of Instruction, proposed future instruction and an interview with the supervisors and instructors of the CLOAC program at Fort Lee, VA and Aberdeen Proving Grounds (APG), VA for Ordnance specific instruction.

#### HYPOTHESES

The hypotheses or assertions that support the main Thesis for this study are:

1. The CLOAC instruction does not prepare Ordnance officers to be effective maintenance company commanders and multifunctional staff officers.

2. Quality of instructors effects the quality of instruction.

3. The lack of teamwork between other agencies effects the quality of instruction.

## PROCEDURES

The methodology used for this study was a review of material and interviews with subject matter experts (SME) who were the supervisors or instructors for CLOAC. The following supervisors and instructors were interviewed: BG Dickinson (Chief of Ordnance), Colonel Allen (Chief of Staff for Ordnance Center and School), LTC (P) Robert English (Director of Training, Ordnance), LTC Ard McConnell (CLOAC Director), LTC McNulty (Director of Officer Instruction-ALMC), Ms. McDonough (Operations officer for CLOAC), Major Ball (Ordnance CLOAC instructor), CPT Gerholdt (Ordnance instructor) and Mr. Richard Strongin (Director of Training-CASCOM). MG Robert Shadley (OD) provided an email response to the paper's questions. The material provided by the school was the Program of Instruction, current and projected, and the documents used for developing the Learning Objectives. The material used for background discussion was obtained from the Army War College (AWC) library and AWC course material.

## BACKGROUND

A person might be hard pressed in an Army War College seminar dialogue to make a solid argument that the U. S. Army was our nation's Center of Gravity. Even more so, that the officer Professional Military

Education system was a Decisive Point.<sup>9</sup> However, we should take PME serious as the quality of our officer corps is affected by the quality of leader development. In fact the U. S. Army Ordnance Corps' vision pamphlet states that "Leader development is ultimately the capability that will ensure our Army remains the world's dominant land power and a critical component of the nation's strategic force."<sup>10</sup>

One part of the leader development in the training triad, Institutional education, and training, plays an important part in an officer's career. Education and training in an institutional environment has limitations, but sets the tone and groundwork for further development in operational assignments and self-development. It is important that our endstate ensures we have competent leaders in their field of expertise.

Competency can be defined as "the knowledge, skills, attributes and capacities that enable a leader to perform his/[her] tasks. ... strategic leader competencies are built on the foundation of leadership requirements at lower levels."<sup>11</sup> This implies that a strategic leader needs to be competent in the skills required of tactical level leadership. A former DCSPER of the Army, LTG Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., stated in his book, A Soldier Supporting Soldiers, "Our lieutenants and captains need to learn leadership and a commodity know-how on which they then can

base the rest of their career."<sup>12</sup>

Unfortunately, reductions in budget have impacted upon the amount of resources that have previously been used to train Ordnance Officers, e.g. a reduction in the course from nine to five months and another two weeks to be cut from the instruction to occur by Fiscal Year 1999.<sup>13</sup> Given these restrictive training constraints on our training base, it will be noteworthy if we achieve the Chief of Staff of the Army's marker, "...that we ... achieve a world class officer corps for the Army of the future."<sup>14</sup>

To understand where the Ordnance officer corps is headed, one should understand OPMS XXI and why the change in a system that has been working.

"General Dennis J. Reimer, convened the OPMS XXI Task Force in July 1996 to review and update as necessary the current OPMS to ensure it remains responsive to future challenges. ... Twice before-in 1971 and again in 1984-the Army assembled task forces to study the OPMS and make recommendations that would best respond to evolving needs."<sup>15</sup>

Whatever the "evolving needs" may be, we must not forget that the bottom line is that "The Army's mission is to fight and win the Nation's Wars."<sup>16</sup> OPMS XXI does not change the requirement for "the finest officers imbued with the warfighting ethos and with the right skills, knowledge and experience to meet effectively any challenges."<sup>17</sup> What

has changed is the "how officers are managed, developed and promoted."<sup>18</sup> Specifically, there will be competition for promotion to lieutenant colonel and colonel within career fields. All officers promoted to major and colonel will attend Command and General Staff College and Senior Service College, respectively. Lastly, the Army intends to implement career fields with distinct groupings of branches that occur for all officers. This will occur no later than after promotion to major.<sup>19</sup> This methodology certainly thrust officers into a decision of selecting their career field earlier than under the previous officer personnel management plan. Additionally, it reinforces the development of logisticians into multifunctional logisticians starting in their Captaincy years.

However, as stated in the OPMS XXI guide, "It is during this time that all Army Competitive Category officers are branch qualified and serve as company commanders, becoming familiar with the Army's basic warfighting mission."<sup>20</sup> The Ordnance officer receives their captaincy Institutional training in the Combined Logistics Officer Advanced Course (CLOAC). This Advanced Course was originally taught only at the respective technical branch's training post.

Due to TRADOC budget cuts in resources, a decision was reached to teach all common skills for logisticians at a central point: Fort Lee's Army Logistics Management

College.<sup>21</sup> Technical skills would be taught in a Temporary Duty (TDY) status at the training Post of the student's respective branch. For Ordnance officers, their technical training would be received at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland. The question remains as to whether or not the reduction in resources has impacted upon our Army's ability to produce quality strategic Ordnance leaders for our future.

#### REVIEW OF MATERIAL

The following discussions reflect the research of material used to assess the Thesis of this study. The discussion starts at the higher levels of the Department of Defense to ascertain the direction of the Army and consequently the Ordnance Corps and its attendant reasons for movement in the specified direction. Then after the macro view, an examination of the micro view of what is or is expected to happen with an Ordnance officer at unit level assignments in the next five-six years. The 5-6 year timeframe is appropriate as that is the timeperiod estimated for use of Advanced course material by the CLOAC graduate prior to attendance at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC).

Macro View-National Level, Joint and Army Level Information

The reduction in the TRADOC training budget is a result of the attempt to reap a Peace Dividend after winning the Cold War. The desire by the citizens of the United States for reductions in our defense budget is no different than at any other time in our history after we fought a war.

The difficulty in establishing a commonly agreed upon national strategic vision negatively impacts on the military's ability to establish a military strategic vision. Dr. Gary L. Guertner stated in his anthology of articles on strategy, that

"Articulating a strategic vision and mobilizing support on its behalf are not panaceas to the problems described here, but they can minimize the harmful effects to a nation that may be drifting toward political isolationism, militant economic protectionism, or military unpreparedness."<sup>22</sup>

The potential of military unpreparedness is the concern of this study as it relates to leader development caused by reduced resources.

In an article by Dr. Dennis S. Ippolito, dated February 15, 1996, he stated that,

"The economic weight of defense (usually calculated as the percentage of gross domestic product [GDP] accounted for by defense spending) is currently at its lowest level since the post-World War II demobilization. Further, the defense budget share is lower than at any time since before World War II."<sup>23</sup>

Ultimately, this reduction in Defense spending impacts upon all soldiers and arguably increases the risk to the United States. The judicious allocation of resources and good stewardship of the taxpayer's dollar are a responsibility for all leaders.

#### JOINT VISION 2010

Logistics is understood to be important by all levels of military leadership. The desire to become more business-like in many of the tasks the American military executes is articulated in different ways. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has published a document to provide a vision for the future of Joint operations. In addition, it discusses the future for the Services as they relate to warfighting in our increasingly Joint world. The Joint vision is "America's Military Preparing for Tomorrow: Quality People Trained, Equipped and Ready for Joint Operations..."<sup>24</sup>

Logistics is a key aspect for achieving the intent of the Chairman's vision for joint operations. Further in Vision 2010, CJCS discussed the importance of power projection and conducting resupply operations. This concept has been named Focused Logistics and is a tenet of Joint Vision 2010.

"Focused logistics will be the fusion of information, logistics and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift assets even while enroute, and to deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of operations. ... providing support in hours or days versus weeks."<sup>25</sup>

Obviously, today's operations will have a different face in the future. A change in the ability to gather and process information, make decisions and provide clear orders will have to be made in exponential levels quicker than the present system allows. The implication is that Army logistics officers will have a cultural change in thought process.<sup>26</sup>

#### Army Vision 2010 and US Army Posture Statement FY 98

The CSA's statement on Focused Logistics is essentially the same as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Reimer also makes it pointedly clear that significant reliance upon technology is necessary for the vision. "Technology, once again, will be a great enabler of the concept of focused logistics."<sup>27</sup> Looking to the future with an eye on how technology can assist the Army is important, but not the only attribute to achieve the Army vision.

In the Army's Posture Statement for FY 98, it is clear that "Army leaders must be able to make rapid, doctrinally sound decisions as they plan and execute missions in diverse, high-pressure operational environments. . . . They must be creative at solving problems and capable of operating in complex, ambiguous, ever-changing environments."<sup>28</sup> The abilities outlined by General Reimer imply a highly trained officer corps that is imbued in the learning process as a way of life to ensure readiness for mission execution. To be ready at all times is like the Boy Scout motto "Be Prepared."<sup>29</sup>

General Creighton Abrams' Comments relate to OUR Future

" 'I consider the basic task of the Army to be readiness.' Readiness as he defined it involved training, equipment, and people, but even more important it involved a state of mind. That state of mind, or attitude, included 'devotion to duty and service, and a dedication to being competent, professional soldiers' with [a] positive approach to tasks, mental flexibility, receptivity to change both inside and outside the Army, and action instead of lip service."<sup>30</sup>

This discussion could have been conducted with any of our current leaders. Constantly focusing on the person and

the leader, General Abrams focused on the strength of the Army. General Reimer states the same thought as "Soldiers are our Credentials."<sup>31</sup>

#### Readiness According to the Army Staff

Concerning Readiness Challenges and Training the Force, a recent speaker at the Army War College commented on the following issues: (1) Ensure the highest quality education and training, (2) Modernize training policies and processes, (3) Continue unit training as a key building block to readiness and (4) Maximize use of Modeling and Simulation, Embedded Training, and Advanced Distributed Learning.<sup>32</sup> All of these issues require a quality officer corps competent in training management and focused on the future aspects of the army.

Less resource intense methods is an area that many training bases are attempting to wrestle with for a proper solution. What aspects of instructor contact training can be replaced with new ideas that reduce resource expenditure, yet keep standards the same or improve them? Clearly, another speaker had it correctly when he briefed, "You can't build a STAR WARS army with COLD WAR thinking."<sup>33</sup>

#### Education and Learning Environment

The basis for all learning is to impart knowledge. Each school goes about teaching its students information

that the leaders feel is important. In addition, the schools provide information as they best see fit for their students. In all cases, "It is here that education most openly reveals itself to be what it has always been beneath the surface of its commonplace routines: an institution concerned first and last with helping human beings learn how to live up to the norms of a given culture."<sup>34</sup> The military Ordnance culture, is partially imbued at CLOAC.

The ability to learn the "norms" is important for a martial culture, especially one as complex as the U. S. Army. The norms of our future military members require, as previously stated, officers who can think in an ambiguous environment. Hence, our military education institutions generally follow Mary Warnock's view, "that a good education must, above all things, be directed towards the strengthening of the faculty of imagination. ... It is what enables one to see things as *significant*."<sup>35</sup>

So, why do students go back to school? In the case of the military's PME, there is required attendance at different military schools necessary for advancement in rank or their chosen career field. Overall, a summation for anybody's rationale for further adult schooling could best be, "They need credentials to qualify for new jobs or promotions. There are skills, perspectives, or knowledge they want to acquire to live more fully."<sup>36</sup>

Schools have always struggled with how to encourage students to take responsibility for their own education. Officers do need the skills or knowledge required for advancement in rank provided by the military's PME. However, what is the best way to facilitate their learning, so that they wish to learn?

As Peter Senge states in his book The Fifth Discipline, "People learn most rapidly when they have a genuine sense of responsibility for their actions. ... if we know our fate is in our own hands, our learning matters."<sup>37</sup> They have input into the ability to affect their destiny, hence education that is by rote is neither necessarily in the student's nor the institution's best interest. The desire for efficiency and maybe better effectiveness currently appears to be a major driving force in TRADOC.

#### ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION

The information was analyzed in light of the previous discussion of material provided by the different levels of military leadership and others in the development of education concepts. The format of this analysis takes the form of answering the Questions proposed via an examination of the Interview questions and the recipients' answers, then an examination of the course material provide by CLOAC at Fort Lee, VA and APG, MD. Overall, the end result was a

collection of observations and impressions formed by the author from the different SMEs' input and review of material, not empirical data such that would better stand the scrutiny of the scientific method.

The initial phase is answering the Questions according to the interview of the different SMEs. The SMEs comprise two different groups: one group at Fort Lee, VA and the other at APG, MD. The Fort Lee group focuses on the common core skills for all logisticians and the multifunctional skills. The APG group focuses on the company commander skills necessary for a maintenance Ordnance officer.

#### ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM QUESTIONS<sup>38</sup>

**Question one** refers to the use of a "vision" for development of the course at either the common training or the branch specific training. At no time did anybody refer to the Army's vision or a vision provided by any of the logistics training departments. The author's perception was that which could more correctly be determined as a Purpose or Mission statement was used. The Purpose or Mission Statement for CLOAC could be stated as the necessity to provide the field force in the Army a requisite number of Captains knowledgeable in common and technical branch commander tasks and being knowledgeable of multifunctional operations for use as a brigade level logistics officer.

Question two regarding "core proficiencies" was understood by the APG training personnel and not as clearly by the Fort Lee supervisors. APG stated that they used the Military Qualification Standard (MQS) manual for Ordnance captains as their requirements based document. Mr. Strongin, Director of Training at CASCOM stated that the new officer training system should be used and not MQS. In addition, APG could explain what the delta of trained versus not trained was for their students. Unfortunately, commanders are not informed of the untrained delta, but the APG trainers thought it might be wise to include that information in the Pre-Command Course packet for battalion/brigade commanders. There are only two tasks not taught at APG from the MQS for Ordnance branched officers: (1.) Coordinate Movement Request Processing and (2.) Plan Transport by Helicopter.

The Fort Lee CLOAC trainers could not provide an answer other than they teach mostly TRADOC common core tasks. In addition, they include an identified need for training Communications Skills and the CLOAC instructor developed multifunctional staff officer tasks. There is no overarching study or requirements determination of what tasks should be taught given an unconstrained environment other than the TRADOC common core tasks for Phase I. The "common core" for all Advanced courses was determined at

TRADOC by input from the field and senior officers. Consequently, with all phases taken into considerations, there is no delta to inform commanders in the field of their training requirement.

In addition, the information is generally broad based in order to discuss multifunctional logistics from the factory to the foxhole. While Fort Lee teaches tactics and tactical logistics in Phase III, to the outside observer it appears, regrettably, to achieve breadth and not depth of understanding operations in the Brigade sector. It suffers only due to no field training and the need for more hands-on training. Again, an issue of time constraints not desires of the supervisors.

The lack of field training also inhibits the potential for developing confidence in the subjects taught prior to their next assignment. However, the lack of complaints from the field has led the supervisors to believe that this is not an area of great concern. To Fort Lee's great credit, they have recognized a need for Communications Skills and have implemented a program to overcome recognized officer deficiencies that apparently is working very well.

**Question three** regarding the priority of command versus staff training appears to be an even proposition. The Fort Lee CLOAC Phase I (TRADOC common core tasks) and Phase III (multifunctional tasks) are allowed seven and eight weeks,

respectively. By a time analysis, it would appear that commander training takes a backseat to staff officer training. However, the technical branch training at APG, during Phase II for five weeks, also concentrates on commander training tasks. So, a combined twelve weeks for mostly company commander tasks versus seven weeks on mostly multifunctional staff officer tasks indicates a greater emphasis on company commander training.

One should note that there is no field training time at Fort Lee. APG previously had an FTX for Ordnance CLOAC, but it was dropped in 1997 due to resource constraints. The current Chief of Ordnance is "relooking that decision."<sup>39</sup>

In addition, the technical competence at phase II has minimal hands on with the equipment. As MG Shadley, current FORSCOM G-4 and past Chief of Ordnance stated, "We have folks coming into OD who have no idea what mechanical equipment is all about."<sup>40</sup> Ordnance officers better drilled on maintenance practices might be a consideration. Currently, the Ordnance CLOAC POI indicates often less than an hour on specified pieces of equipment, which allows at best a familiarization.

Asking the question reference the emphasis of leadership skills such as Troop Leading Procedures, mission analysis, orders development, confirmation briefs and rehearsals reveals a lack of emphasis on training those

skills for a company commander. These skills would also benefit a staff officer and more importantly a logistics battle captain.

**Question four** pertains to how CLOAC ensures the quality of the program. At Fort Lee, the school uses a post instruction survey for phases I and III. This is a standard ALMC school survey, that is not CLOAC specific. A CLOAC class end-of-course critique is put together by the class S-2/3. A post graduation survey has been conducted twice with the CLOAC graduates and their supervisors. The return rates on the post graduation surveys have not been sufficient to draw a strong conclusion is the opinion of the CLOAC operations officer. In the summer of 1997, the CLOAC director surveyed CLOAC graduates and their battalion commanders on-site at Fort Hood and Fort Polk. The information to date has indicated an increased need for administrative and legal training. However, lack of resources blocks increasing the POI as it is a zero sum gain, i.e. in order to add you have to drop a subject. Information from the National Training Center indicated a requirement for more Security Operations training and that was added to the program at Fort Lee and APG over a year ago.

The APG CLOAC instructors use lesson critique sheets, critiques for the FTX and end of course critique for their

quality control system. In addition, there are command and staff visits to assess the quality of instruction.

**Question five** referred to the different types of instructional methods used at the schools. Instructor contact is the preferred method, mostly in the classroom. APG does have some field training only at the Officer Basic Course (not Advanced Course as previously discussed) with a student to instructor ratio- 1:10-17. This is a resource issue of manning. APG suffers, like the rest of the Army, with taskings for Bosnia, Honduras and other requirements. There are attempts to use CD-ROMs or a Homepage to reduce resources i.e., instructors, but that has not occurred yet. Two weeks of instruction will go to a CASCOM homepage, be imbedded in other classes or be provided as handouts by October 1998. Excluding simulations, the normal gauntlet of instructional methods is being used.

**Question six** pertains to instructor quality. Each school said that their quality standard for captains is recent company command in a divisional environment, ability to make major and be competitive for CGSC. They also want officers from the CTCs in the Project Warrior program. Fort Lee appears to be achieving that standard with only three officers in recent memory not making major. The recent CGSC list had four of six instructors make the list. They have two Project Warrior officers on the staff. The instructors

not making major are taken off the platform to perform other duties.

APG has not done as well with their quality and with lower CLOAC staffs requirements (20 versus 22 for Fort Lee) the lack of quality file officers hurts. Only 75% are Branch Qualified in MTOE units of the twenty officers assigned. Of the fourteen Ordnance officers assigned, only three commanded in divisions and one of those in a HHD. Three officers are not branch qualified. In addition, of the five eligible officers for promotion to major only three were selected. Officer shortages are such that it is difficult to replace the non-selects on the training platform. Lastly, only one of seven eligible officers was selected for CGSC in FY 96 and zero of five for FY 97.<sup>41</sup>

Each school has an instructor-training program, but again due to resources the APG program is significantly less structured than the one at Fort Lee. The bottomline is that each certification process conforms to the standard established by TRADOC. The APG CLOAC program would appear to struggle with the requirements more due to resource constraints.

Diversity is not at current Army rates for the Fort Lee CLOAC program. At Fort Lee, there are only 2 females and 3 race minorities out of the 22 instructors. All 3 officers are Black with no Asians or Hispanics amongst the group.

Overall the CLOAC structure is run by white male officers, excluding the Fort Lee CLOAC operations officer who is a Department of the Army civilian-white female. The APG program currently has out of the twenty-one instructors: 13 White males, 3 Black females, 2 White females, 2 Black males, and 1 Hispanic male. Overall, diversity is about 40% of female and minority instructors.<sup>42</sup> The issue for Fort Lee is to assign officers representing the diversity of our officer corps and achieve the requisite quality of experience and performance with the officers assigned to APG, VA at the Ordnance school.

**Question seven** queries whether cross-talk or interstaffing occurs between the schools, ALMC and other Advanced courses. The appearance is that limited discussion occurs amongst the schools in order to learn from each other, i.e. pass on Lessons Learned or conduct After Action Reviews. There is little attempt to use available resources outside the CLOAC structure. Some issues raised could be resolved by using ALMC for statistical analysis or to individualize a CLOAC survey. CLOAC could ask the Masters program at ALMC, provided by the Florida Institute of Technology, to conduct studies on CLOAC's needs and not have their (FIT) students decide what they wish to write for a Masters paper. In addition, there appears to be contact with other Advanced courses only when required to coordinate

TRADOC directed actions. Lastly, there appears to be no standardized method to share good ideas amongst the schools like what used to occur in tactical Divisions with the G-3 training notes.

**Question eight** was an attempt to ascertain how well the Army and civilian business agreed on leader development. Three out of four of the questions appear to be the same: Tasks address challenges of organization, hence the training is linked to challenges faced by the individual. Lastly, the training does focus deliberately on developing teamwork and establishing networks.<sup>43</sup>

The question on "vision" is not well understood and may be less developed as a necessary requirement in the Army. This is especially true at lower levels as all respondents were confused by the question. They understood their localized mission statement for training, but not how it might integrate with another higher level vision.

#### Analysis of the Course Material and POI

The course booklets provided by Fort Lee are superb. They all have briefing charts with room for notes. They clearly explain the lesson's tasks and allow a before class review of the material. APG does not have the same quality level methodology, but does provide enough course material for the students to have walk-away material and review prior to class. APG, as previously mentioned, is "relooking"

their cancelled FTX that allows practical application of course material. The "Ordnance on the Battlefield" and multifunctional briefings at APG and Fort Lee, respectfully, allow an officer to develop good briefing skills. Good enough that the Combine Arms Service Support School(CAS3) at Leavenworth has commented on the higher level of initial preparation for their requirements by CLOAC graduates, than other Advanced course branch schools. However, good briefing skills do not necessarily make a good logistics battle captain. A logistics battle captain (brigade assistant S-4) knowledgeable in assessment using the Commanders' Critical Information Requirements, synthesizing that information and making timely decisions or recommendations to the commander should also be part of the standard.

#### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

None of the three hypotheses was proven. The thesis of this paper is not valid. There is no discernable information that presently indicates Ordnance officers will not develop into competitive, valued strategic leaders. However, a counterintuitive instinctive feeling that reducing training time, tasks, hands-on training and not informing the field force of the training tasks delta can not be right for training world class officers. It is the

author's opinion that CLOAC with its constraint induced POI is not an overall improvement for our Army's leader development of future strategic leaders. This should not take away from the superb achievements that the CLOAC instructors and supervisors obtain with every graduating CLOAC class; my hat's off to them.

In the author's opinion, the following might improve the quality of the program:

1. Conduct a survey of Ordnance leaders who are currently serving or have served in tactical units. Determine from their point of view tasks needed to be performed by maintenance company commanders and multifunctional brigade staff officers (logistics battle captains). Use of the FIT program at ALMC would allow this to occur. Time should not be used as a constraint unless a risk assessment is provided.

2. Assign high quality officers to CLOAC (increase diversity at Fort Lee and improve quality at APG) who should be our future senior leaders. Achieve at least minority parity in relationship to the rest of the logistics career fields with the CLOAC instructors; ensure diversity. A fair share of quality officers, who commanded other than HHDs in divisions, should be assigned.

3. Define what QA/QC procedures will be used at all locations. Use ALMC assets to develop CLOAC specific

surveys for use at all the training locations.

Statisticians at ALMC can assist with data analysis from the surveys, too.

4. Develop methods for sharing information between the schools and other Advanced courses. First determine what information would be beneficial to share. If nothing else, a status of where they stand on using finite resources. Good ideas on training management would be beneficial.

5. Recommend a decision be made when the Force XXI CSS Redesign and its new Doctrine, TTPs, force/equipment structure and leader development requirements should be implemented; sooner is better than later. The need to backward plan to ensure adequate resources is important. This type of planning stretches across several fiscal years before the classes are finally started.

#### SUMMARY

Although the Thesis was not proven, it bears more scrutiny. The veneer review at the school level was not sufficient to determine the impact in tactical units nor has there been a graduate who has served long enough to determine the program's impact on strategic development.

It is apparent that units are not complaining about the CLOAC product i.e., the student graduate. This could be for a number of reasons ranging from an adequate CLOAC program

to a high quality Ordnance officer corps able to learn quickly and make the mission happen.

The development of Ordnance Strategic Leaders is a time consuming process potentially taking twenty years or more. CLOAC instructors and supervisors (from the author's view) are currently putting forth a superb effort in the face of resource constraints. However, the concern that business may be overtaking the military in leader development like it did with technology is probably legitimate. Anecdotal information like the establishment of a Training Professionals' Book Club indicates the amount of interest with leader development and training in the private sector.<sup>44</sup>

The Army vision should be supported by tasks taught at CLOAC starting in an unconstrained environment. This allows the Army to develop the overall requirements for its Ordnance captains. In addition, the Army should support the CLOAC schools with quality divisional experienced officers representing the diversity of our officer corps. By assigning the right officers and developing the right POI for CLOAC, the Institutional training phase outlined in STP 21-11-MQS remains an important part of the Army's leader development program for strategic Ordnance leaders.

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## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Martin Van Creveld, Command in War, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 170.

<sup>2</sup> George Friedman and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War, (New York, New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1996), 9.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., xi.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> U. S. Department of the Army, MOS II Manual of Common Tasks for Lieutenants and Captains, STP 21-11-MOS, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, January 1991), 1-1.

<sup>6</sup> U. S. Department of the Army, Army Leadership, Field Manual 22-100, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 31 July 1990), i.

<sup>7</sup> Barbara Scherb, Gender Communication Differences: The Impact on Strategic Leadership and Decisionmaking (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Research Paper, 1997), 1. Note that this is a use of writing style and ideas.

<sup>8</sup> Robert M. Fulmer and Albert A. Vicere, Executive Education and Leadership Development: the State of the Practice, (University park, PA: The Penn State Institute for the Study of Organizational Effectiveness, 1995), 5.

<sup>9</sup> Phillip Kevin Giles and Thomas P. Galvin, Center of Gravity: Determination, Analysis, and Application, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, 1996), 1 and 15.

<sup>10</sup> Chief of Ordnance Corps: Ordnance Corps Vision: America's Army of the 21st Century, undated, 27.

<sup>11</sup> Herbert Harback, ed., Leading and Management in the Strategic Arena: A Reference Text 1996-1997, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1996), 96.

<sup>12</sup> Joeseph M. Heiser, Jr., A Soldier Supporting Soldiers, (Washington, D. C.: Center for Military History, 1991), 181.

<sup>13</sup> Paula McDonough, Operations Officer at Fort Lee CLOAC, interview with author, 14 December 1997, Fort Lee, VA.

<sup>14</sup> Dennis J. Reimer, WHAT IS OPMS XXI? and other frequently asked questions. An Officer's Guide to the Officer Personnel Management System for the 21st Century. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Undated), i.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Paraphrase, Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>21</sup> McDonough

<sup>22</sup> Cary L Guertner, ed. The Search For Strategy: Politics and Strategic Vision, (Greenwood Press: Westport, CT, 1993), 307.

<sup>23</sup> Harback, Section by Dennis S. Ippolito, Federal Budget Policy and Defense Strategy. 209.

<sup>24</sup> John M. Shalikashvili, Joint Vision 2010, (Unknown who and where published, undated), Inside of cover page.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 24.

<sup>26</sup> The ideas in this paragraph are based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandant's Lecture Series.

<sup>27</sup> Dennis J. Reimer, Army Vision 2010, (Unknown who and where published, undated), 15.

<sup>28</sup> Dennis J Reimer and Togo D. West, Jr., United States Army Posture Statement FY98, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1997), 34.

<sup>29</sup> Robert C. Birkby, Boy Scouts of America Handbook, (Irving, Texas: Boy Scouts of America), 9.

<sup>30</sup> Harback, 75.

<sup>31</sup> Reimer and West, Front Cover.

<sup>32</sup> Briefing charts for AWC students presented in the Commandant's Lecture Series.

<sup>33</sup> Briefing charts presented to AWC students in the Commandant's Lecture Series.

<sup>34</sup> Theodore Brameld, Cultural Foundations of Education: An Interdisciplinary Exploration, (New York: New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1957), 13.

<sup>35</sup> Mary Warnock, edited by R. S. Peters in The Philosophy of Education: Towards a definition of quality in Education, (Oxford, England: The Chaucer Press, 1980), 112.

<sup>36</sup> David O Justice and Catherine Marienau, Self-Assessment: Essential Skills for Adult Learners edited by Hutchings, Pat and Wutzdorff, Allen in Knowing and Doing: Learning Through Experience, San Fransisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Inc, 1988), 49.

<sup>37</sup> Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline, New York, New York: Doubleday, 1994), 287.

<sup>38</sup> LTC John McNulty, LTC Ard McConnell, Ms. Paula McDonough, LTC Robert English, MAJ Cole and CPT Gerholdt, interviewed by author, 14 & 15 December 1997 at Fort Lee, VA and APG, MD. All specific information in the analysis section is taken from those interviews, unless credited by other endnotes.

<sup>39</sup>, Rich Strongin, <strongir lee-dns1.army.mil> "RE: Initial DRAFT of paper," electronic mail message to Claude Shipley <Shipleyod aol.com>, 17 February 1998.

<sup>40</sup> Robert Shadley, MG <shadleyr forsocom.army.mil>, "Request For information." Electronic mail message to Claude Shipley <ShipleyOD AOL.COM>. 20 January 1998.

<sup>41</sup> "KP" Kirkpatrick <kirkpatrickP OCS2.army.mil> "Request For Information." Electronic mail message forwarded to Claude Shipley <shipleyc carlisle-emh2.army.mil> from Major Cole. 2 February 1998.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Sheila Stevens <sheila.stevens erols.cm>, "Information," electronic mail message to Claude Shipley <Shipleyod aol.com>, 19 January 1998.

<sup>44</sup> Training Professionals' Book Club, Blacklick, OH, A Division of the McGraw-Hill Companies. This was observed in an advertisement sent to the author's quarters. The author has since joined the book club.



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